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1 Years  after  the withdrawal  of  US combat  troops from the country,  conflict  and
instability in Iraq still make the headlines in the international media.1 Policy-makers in
Washington, however, no longer show any particular appetite for large scale military
interventions in the Middle East or assertive efforts to reshape the political order in the
region.2 US  policy  toward  the  area  is  evolving  in  parallel  with  the  effort  to  adapt
America's global strategy to new political realities and budgetary constraints.  “In the
next 10 years,” wrote former US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton in a seminal policy
statement announcing the Obama administration's “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific, “we need
to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy.”3
2 A fresh look at  US geopolitical  priorities  and a  shift  away from Middle  Eastern
military adventures seems a wise foreign policy approach indeed. Yet, in spite of plans for
a “pivot,” the Persian Gulf is set to remain a major source of concern for US policy-
makers.  This  inescapable  trend  is  demonstrated  by  the  still  significant  US  military
presence in the region, by the Obama administration's painstaking efforts to reach a deal
aimed  at  ensuring  the  peaceful  intent  of  the  Iranian  nuclear  program,  and  by
Washington's military intervention in Iraq in the summer of 2014, in order to sustain a
wobbly Baghdad government under heavy pressure from Islamic State – a radical Islamist
movement currently in control of large swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria.4
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3 The challenges that make it so difficult and painful for the US – and for its closest
Western allies as well – to work out a policy toward the Gulf region are deep-rooted and
extremely  relevant.  On  the  one  hand,  as  the  painful  experience  of  US  military
intervention in Iraq between 2003 and 2011 has shown, Washington politicians cannot,
and should not, be seduced by delusional plans to dominate the region and reorganize it
according to their own preferences.5 On the other hand, they cannot afford to ignore such
a strategically and economically relevant area. This is why, even after the withdrawal of
US combat  troops  from Iraq,  American military  power  and a  significant  US military
presence are still a critical factor in the region's balance of power.6
4 As  this  article  argues  in  the  following  sections,  energy  security  is  the  most
consistent  rationale  for  US  and  Western  engagement  in  the  Persian  Gulf.  Both  as  a
superpower and as the West's leading security provider, the US has seen its commitment
to  the  stability  of  the  Gulf  region and the  preservation of  access  to  its  oil  supplies
increase. US Persian Gulf policy, however, has been shaped not only by pure geopolitical
considerations, but also by ideological factors concerning America's status and role in
international relations. Until recently, this essay observes, US policy toward the Persian
Gulf was distorted by the appeal of America's unchallenged military primacy. Confronted
with the contradictions and dilemmas of promoting ideals and protecting the national
interest, US policy-makers demonstrated a remarkable penchant for instituting policies
that overestimated the potential of America's military power as a tool for creating new
political realities and favorable outcomes in the region. Such an approach has proved to
be extremely costly and frustrating, while the time seems ripe to explore new strategies.
Faced with  the  painful  but  inescapable  challenges  coming from the  Gulf,  the  article
concludes, the US, and its Western allies, should focus their efforts in the promotion a
more inclusive and less militarized regional order. 
 
2. Energy security and strategy
5 “One does not need to be a rocket scientist,” Gregory Gause points out, “or even a
political scientist, to know that oil is why the outside world cares about the Persian Gulf.”
7 More specifically, it seems fair to argue that the US's – and the West's – paramount
source  of  concern  with  regard  to  the  Gulf  is  to  ensure  a  stable  access  to,  and  an
uninterrupted flow of, oil supplies from the region.8 It is useful to notice, as observed by
Robert  Keohane,  that,  along  with  a  stable  international  monetary  system  and  the
provision of open markets for goods, access to oil at stable prices was one of the key
pillars of the international order promoted and directed by the US from the end of the
Second World War to the early 1970s.9
6 The modern oil industry was born in the United States, but by the end of World War
Two American leaders became aware that the US domestic production of oil would no
longer be able to meet the country's expanding demand for energy. As a consequence,
Middle Eastern oil came to be seen in Washington as a critical resource to ensure Western
Europe's  economic  revival10 –  and by implication as  a  key  pillar  of  US and Western
security.11 Seen through that prism, the different “Doctrines” announced by American
presidents since the late 1940s appear strikingly informative and consistent.12 In March
1947 President Truman first rang the alarm bell by arguing that the political stability in
Greece and Turkey and the two countries' inclusion in the Western camp were essential
in order to counter the danger of “confusion and disorder” throughout the Middle East.13
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Ten  years  later,  in  January  1957,  it  was  President  Eisenhower's  turn  to  ask  the  US
Congress  to endorse,  and provide financial  support  for,  a  series  of  policies  aimed at
providing the economic and military assistance necessary to ensure the independence
and security of “the free nations of the Mid-East.”14 The picture was completed in January
1980, when President Carter famously stated that
7 An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be
regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an
assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.15
8 Along the same lines, a number of examples, present and past, make it possible to
discern  a  critical  element  in  the  logic  driving  Western  and  US  policies,  particularly
military interventions, in the Southern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf since 1945:
the imperative of ensuring an uninterrupted flow of Middle Eastern oil, and of preventing
any “hostile” regime from seizing control of the region's energy resources.16 By the 1950s
the Suez Canal was the most important gateway through which Persian Gulf oil reached
Western  Europe.  Nasser's   decision  to  nationalize  the  canal  and  the  fear  of  an
interruption in the oil flows was a key factor underpinning the awkward and inglorious
Anglo-French military intervention against Egypt in collusion with Israel in late 1956.17
Analogous  considerations,  combined  with  humanitarian  concerns  and  calculations
relating to domestic politics, were at play in 2011 – fifty-five years later – as the same two
powers led NATO's military intervention in Libya in support of insurgents fighting to
topple the Qaddafi regime. Libya's “sweet” crude oil could not be easily replaced in the
production of gasoline by many European refineries.18 US leaders seriously considered the
use  of  military  force  as  a  possible  response  to  the  embargo  announced  by  the
Organization  of  Arab  Petroleum  Exporting  Countries  as  an  apparent  “weapon”  to
pressure Western countries into abandoning their support for Israel at the time of the
October War of 1973.19 Washington did resort to military intervention  during the last
phases  of  the  Iran-Iraq  War,  when  the  Reagan  administration  decided  to  re-flag  oil
tankers from Kuwait and other Gulf Arab monarchies and to deploy US warships in the
Gulf in order to counter the threat posed by Iran to the free passage of Persian Gulf oil
through the Strait of Hormuz.20 An analogous threat to the flow of oil through the Strait
became a major source of concern in 2012 due to the confrontation between the West and
Iran revolving around the Teheran regime's nuclear program.21 In fact, the specter of a
disruptive military confrontation cast a dark shadow throughout the delicate negotiating
process that led to the July 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran, the US, and other
major powers.22
9 America's military involvement in the Middle East, particularly in the Persian Gulf,
is thus consistent with a well-established pattern of Western security policy, and appears
to be the expression of a grand strategy aimed not merely at ensuring the energy needs of
the US, but rather at reducing the risk of instability in the global oil market – since global
oil shocks would inevitably have negative effects on fuel prices at the pump in the US.23
 
3. Ideology and American grand strategy
10
Geopolitics and energy security have not been the only factors driving US policy
toward the Persian Gulf. America's quest for the stability and security of world energy
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supplies has been strongly influenced, and often distorted, by ideological considerations
concerning the nature of US power and America's role in international relations.
11
During  the  Cold  War,  US  global  strategy  was  informed  by  the  imperative  of
containing  communism. Hence, American policy toward the Persian Gulf was conceived
and implemented within the wider framework of countering the spread of communism
and Soviet influence in the Middle East.24 It seems fair, in retrospect, to argue that US
leaders  tended to  overestimate  the  aggressive  designs  of  their  Kremlin  counterparts
concerning the Gulf area while they failed to appreciate the development of political and
strategic challenges from within the region,  such as the rise of  Islamist  extremism.25
However, it is important to acknowledge that the perception of the Soviet threat was not
unjustified. By the end of the 1970s, Moscow's rising activism in the Horn of Africa and
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan dramatically increased the level of concern among US
leaders about the security of the Persian Gulf.26 As noted above, it is indeed from the early
1980s onward that US military involvement in the region began to rise, first with the
creation of  a  Rapid  Reaction Force  by  the  Carter  administration,  and then with  the
establishment by the Reagan administration of the Central Command (CENTCOM) – a new
unified military command tasked with the planning of military operations in the region
stretching from the Middle East to Southwest Asia.27
12
The collapse of communism and the end of the Soviet threat have imposed a critical
reassessment of US grand strategy. Confronted with the challenges of the post-Cold War
era, American officials and opinion makers on both sides of the political spectrum found
inspiration  in  the  traditional  US  commitment  to  the  promotion  of  a  liberal  and
democratic world order.28 An important legacy of the Cold War experience, however, was
the reality of America's massive and unchallenged military power.29 It seems indeed fair
to argue that the very preservation of such an unchallenged military primacy became an
objective per se according to a great many American policy-makers and foreign policy
circles.30 As suggested by Andrew Bacevich, “at the end of the Cold War Americans said
yes to military power.”31 Post-Cold War US leaders promoted different worldviews and
adopted different foreign policy approaches – as well as different plans to revive the
American economy and society – but it seems fair to argue that all US presidents and
their  national  security  teams  were  seduced  by  the  idea  that  as  the  world's  only
superpower, the United States enjoys an unchallenged position of material and moral
superiority. By implication, leaders in Washington tended to define their foreign policy
objectives independently from the specific dynamics of the conflicts in which the US
decided to get involved, and almost without paying attention to the interests and the
priorities of other great powers or regional actors. Confronted with the contradictions
and dilemmas of promoting ideals and protecting the national interest, US policy-makers
demonstrated  a  remarkable  penchant  for  instituting  policies  that  overestimated  the
potential of America's military power as a tool for creating new political realities and
favorable balances of power overseas.32 US policy towards the Gulf somewhat embodies
that delusional trend – Washington's military involvement in the region progressively
increased since the 1980s, reaching its apex with the Iraq War of 2003.33
13
The enormous human and economic costs of US military interventions in Iraq and
Afghanistan,  combined with the  financial  crisis  of  2008,  appear  to  have significantly
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moderated this historical trend. Since taking office in 2009, the Obama administration has
been remarkably less inclined than its predecessors to put boots on the ground overseas,
although it is not entirely clear whether that depends on a profound reassessment of
America's role in the world or rather by budgetary constraints and the recent memory of
military  quagmires.34The  Obama  administration  took  office  after  years  of  consuming
overseas military commitments and in the midst of the worst economic crisis since 1929.
Inevitably, the administration's main efforts have concentrated on avoiding economic
collapse and promoting reform at home. During the first term, the most pressing foreign
policy  issue  was  in  fact  the  need to  cope  with the  challenges  inherited by  the  past
administration.35As a newly elected president, Obama articulated an appealing foreign
policy outlook, which called for a conception of US global leadership based on institutions
and the international rule of law, multilateralism and diplomacy rather than outright
military power. This cautious and diplomacy-savvy approach appears to have allowed the
US to manage international crises without the need to resort to new, massive, and open-
ended  overseas  military  commitments,  although  not  all  of  the  high  expectations
originally raised by Obama have been turned into actual policies.36 In practical terms, as
reported by James Mann, the Obama administration's key foreign policy concept was
“rebalancing,”  the  idea  that  it  was  necessary  for  the  US  to  refrain  from  military
adventures  overseas  and,  in  general,  to  adopt  a  more  pragmatic  attitude  on  the
international stage.37However,  the increasing resort to air power – particularly drone
strikes – and special forces for counter-terrorism operations, as well as the critical US
role in the early phases of NATO's air campaign in Libya, suggest that after all Obama and
his foreign policy staff are not so shy about using force.38As the end of the second term
approaches, the foreign policy approach of the Obama administration has evolved toward
a doctrine of “engagement” aimed at improving relations with countries – such as Iran,
Cuba, and Myanmar – that have been at odds with the US but appear ready to sit at the
negotiating table.39 In the ultimate analysis, however, the Obama administration's foreign
policy is still in the making, and it is impossible to assess what its long term legacy will
be.
14
What seems fair to argue so far is that ideology and perception have encouraged the
militarization of US policy toward the Persian Gulf.  That,  in turn,  has contributed to
worsen a number of negative regional trends – particularly the growing polarization and
radicalization of local political regimes. The Gulf area is a jigsaw of ethnic and sectarian
identities that overlap with states whose borders and political institutions are relatively
recent  and  often  weakly  legitimized  in  the  eyes  of  the  local  populations.  As  a
consequence, since the emergence of the Gulf as a “regional security complex,”40 local
regimes, especially the most powerful and ambitious among them – Iran, Iraq and Saudi
Arabia – look at each other with suspicion and alarm. The rise of regional powers is
perceived by the other regimes in the area as a threat to their own domestic stability, and
such a perception is often confirmed by the foreign policies actually pursued – the most
blatant example being perhaps the rivalry between Saddam's Iraq and Khomeini's Iran.
Furthermore, such a dynamic has been worsened by volatile but increasing oil revenues,
which  have  distorted  the  pattern  of  economic  and  social  development  of  the  Gulf
countries and placed the region's governments in a position to build disproportionate
and pervasive national security apparatuses.41
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4. The United States and the Persian Gulf: the
paradoxical implications of the clash between
geopolitics and delusions from the Cold War to the
War on Terror
15
Seen  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  interplay  of  geopolitical  necessities  and
ideological imperatives, the story of American involvement in Persian Gulf politics is the
story of a long series of unrealistic expectations, lost opportunities, and dysfunctional
outcomes.
 
4.1 Geopolitics and ideology during the Cold War
16
America's involvement in the region has begun to expand dramatically since the
early 1970s, in the aftermath of Britain's withdrawal from “East of Suez.” By that time,
however, for a variety of reasons Washington was by no means in an ideal position to
replace London as the guarantor of the region's stability and balance of power. First, the
war in Vietnam had severely  eroded Congressional  and popular  support  for  military
engagements  overseas.  Second,  the  protracted  military  effort  in  Southeast  Asia  had
significantly  contributed  to  the  financial  distress  that  had  forced  the  Nixon
administration to suspend and eventually abandon the gold-exchange standard through
which Washington had guaranteed international monetary stability since the end of the
Second World War. Third, the oil shock of 1973 had put an additional burden on the
challenge of reviving the economies of the US and the rest of the industrialized countries
of the West. It was within such a daunting framework that President Nixon formulated
his  doctrine,  according  to  which  America's  interests  overseas  would  increasingly  be
protected by relying on regional partners.42 As for the Persian Gulf, the new American
strategic  outlook  translated  into  the  “Twin  Pillar”  approach,  according  to  which
Washington would support – particularly through the sale of larger and larger amounts of
increasingly sophisticated weapons – the rise of Saudi Arabia and, even more important,
of Iran. The two countries were thus supposed to serve as the guarantors of a regional
balance of power favorable to American interests – in spite of the fact that the regimes in
Riyadh and Teheran shared very little in terms of ambitions and strategic priorities.43
17
The Twin Pillars approach was shattered in 1979 by the Iranian Revolution. As the
new regime led by ayatollah Khomeini  was still  consolidating,  the seizure of  the US
embassy  in  Teheran  and  the  subsequent  diplomatic  crisis  dramatically  poisoned
Washington's relations with Teheran. Iran, once perceived as the US's most powerful and
reliable partner in the Gulf,  was now a nemesis in the minds of Americans and their
leaders.44
18
That new state of mind strongly informed Washington's attitude toward the war
between Iran and Iraq.  The Iraqi aggression, incompetently planned and ineffectively
implemented45 in  September  1980  under  the  watch  of  Baghdad  strongman  Saddam
Hussein  –  at  the  time an  unlikely  client  of  the  Soviet  Union –  came to  be  seen by
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strategists in Washington as a sort of opportunity to redress the Gulf's balance of power
according  to  the  American  interest  of  preventing  a  hostile  power  from  achieving
hegemony in the region.
19
Thus,  a  combination  of  emotions  and  geopolitical  opportunism  was  at  the
foundations of the troubled and awkward relationship between the Unites States and Iraq
in the 1980s – a relationship tainted by the Iran-Contra scandal and the bombing by an
Iraqi  fighter  jet  of  a  US  warship  patrolling  the  Persian  Gulf  waters,  but  constantly
corroborated  by  US  economic  support  and  intelligence  assistance  reciprocated  by
gestures of  moderation on the part  of  Saddam Hussein concerning Iraq's  role in the
Middle East.
20
As bluntly revealed by the Iraqi  invasion and seizure of  Kuwait  in August 1990,
however, Saddam's agenda was rather at odds with the wishes of Washington politicians.
Within a few hours the Baghdad regime had ended up in possession of a new piece of very
valuable real estate – according to estimates widely publicized in the aftermath of the
invasion, control of Kuwait ensured direct control of 20% of the world oil reserves and
placed Iraq in a position to threaten Saudi Arabia, which possessed an additional 20%.46
Iraq's aggression changed the White House's perception of Saddam, from someone with
whom it  was  possible  to  “do business”  to  a  “madman”  aiming to  establish an anti-
American hegemony over the Gulf region – a modern version of Adolf Hitler, as Bush père
often suggested in  public,  to  the  dismay of  some of  his  closest  and most  pragmatic
advisers.47
 
4.2 Geopolitics and ideology in the post-Cold War era
21
The Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 was the first crisis of the post-Cold War era, and, in
addition to being essential to the understanding of the foundations of the current US
predicament in the Gulf, is emblematic of the dysfunctional combination of geopolitical
thinking and ideological delusions that have marked the foreign policy of the US as the
sole superpower. The first Bush administration publicly articulated its policy toward the
crisis as an effort to restore international law by resisting Iraq's blatant aggression and
occupation and liberating Kuwait – a sort of international police operation led by the US
under the aegis of  the UN. US strategy,  however,  was geared at  achieving additional
objectives which were much more at variance with the orientations of the international
community as a whole. As seen from the White House, the outcome of the crisis should
have been a new balance of power in the Gulf. On the one hand, Iraq's military power
should be downgraded, and Iraq should be deprived of any non-conventional military
capability – in order not to represent a threat to the US-friendly, oil-exporting Gulf Arab
monarchies. On the other hand, Iraq should stay strong enough to serve as a bulwark
against Iranian influence in the region.48 A critical component of this post-crisis scenario
was an Iraqi leadership strong enough to keep the country united but willing to reorient
its foreign policy in favor of the US  – what was needed, in other words, was a sort of
replica of the idealized perception of the pre-August 1990 Baghdad regime. It is open to
question whether such an optimistic outcome was a realistic objective. Yet, as  recalled by
James Baker,  George H.W.  Bush's  Secretary of  State,  that  conviction was particularly
popular within the administration – the US military machine was expected to defeat
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Saddam so blatantly that someone within his own regime, possibly someone from the
military, would rise against him, as suggested by the president himself during the Gulf
War.49 Thus,  as  argued by Gideon Rose,  “the administration decided that  hope could
indeed be a plan.” Kuwait would be liberated through a massive military intervention. In
the process, Saddam's power base would be destroyed, and the US would “wait” for his
regime to collapse, as recalled by Bush's National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft.50
22
The process  through which the George H.W.  Bush administration articulated its
policy  and  won  UN  Security  Council  approval  for  the  implementation  of  a  military
solution to the Gulf crisis was a masterpiece in diplomacy, and the swift and amazing
success  of  the  US  led  military  campaign  against  Iraq  put  the  US  in  a  position  of
unquestioned authority  within the international  community.  In the aftermath of  the
liberation of Kuwait it became clear that the first Bush administration was endowed with
enormous political capital that could be invested not only in the pursuit of a more stable
and inclusive security arrangement in the Gulf, but also in the advancement toward the
solution of many of the Middle East's most intractable conflicts, such as the Arab-Israeli
conflict. The administration's critical priority, however, was to bring Iraq “back into the
family of nations,”51 which, in retrospect, clearly meant waiting for the optimist scenario
imagined in the run up to operation Desert  Storm to  unfold.  As  it  became clear  that
Saddam would not be overthrown in the short term, however, Bush and his advisers were
forced to imagine and gather international support around continuous adjustments to
their plan. The administration declared its readiness not to violate Iraq's sovereignty or
integrity, yet it promoted an intrusive system of international inspections to monitor the
dismantlement  of  the  Baghdad  regime's  non-conventional  arsenal.  Furthermore,  it
refused to normalize  relations  with Iraq and pushed for  the continuation of  the UN
sanctions regime that had been put in place in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion of
Kuwait as long as Saddam Hussein remained in power. The White House thus invested
most of its political and diplomatic capital on an effort to transform Iraq according to its
wishes,  at  the  expenses  of  exploiting  in  full  the  opportunities  to  negotiate  a
comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. As a paradoxical result, by the time the
George H.W. Bush administration left office, in January 1993, Saddam was still in power in
Iraq,  the  Middle  East  remained  an  unstable region,  a  large  and  visible  US  military
presence was required to “contain” the Baghdad regime and ensure the stability of the
Gulf  region,  and  yet  the  restoration  of  Iraq  as  a  major  oil  producer  was  postponed
indefinitely because of the sanctions regime.
23
Bill Clinton and his staff entered the White House with a worldview and a set of
priorities rather different from those of their predecessors, yet as far as the Persian Gulf
was concerned the new administration didn't question the policy it had inherited. Quite
the contrary, it decided to expand its reach, by turning it into a “Dual Containment”
approach,  intended  to  use  American  power  to  prevent  both  Iraq  and  Iran  from
threatening the stability of the Persian Gulf and to ensure the free flow of oil in the area.52
No one within the Beltway apparently noted that,  having been a victim of  Saddam's
aggression, Iran had been promoting the idea of regime change in Iraq since the 1980s.53
24
Thus,  in the 1990s US policy toward the Gulf  became increasingly based on the
assumption of American primacy and on the idea that the US had the power and the
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authority to marginalize those “rogue regimes” that did not fit into Washington's vision
of world order. As part of the Dual Containment strategy, Iraq was kept under a severe
regime of economic sanctions and constant military pressure – including recurrent US
and allied airstrikes within the country's territory – with dramatic implications for the
Iraqi  population.  From  the  mid-1990s  onward,  moreover,  a  sanctions  regime  was
established against Iran as well, in spite of the rise to power of an Iranian leadership
deeply interested in domestic  reform and the improvement of  relations between the
Teheran regime and the rest of the world.54 Once again, the paradoxical result was that
not only Saddam Hussein remained in power in Iraq, but now both Iran and Iraq – OPEC's
most prominent oil producers after Saudi Arabia – were denied full access to the global oil
market. 
 
4.3 Geopolitics, ideology, and the War on Terror
25
By the late 1990s the policy of containment toward the Gulf had become increasingly
frustrating. It was definitely shattered by the tragedy of 9/11. Al-Qaida's appalling and
unjustifiable terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. were met by virtually
unanimous condemnation on the part of the international community. The American
leadership was in a position to assemble through a shrewd use of diplomacy a strong and
comprehensive international  coalition – as  the George H.W.  Bush administration had
done a decade earlier – and use US power and authority to counter the challenge of
terrorism and  create  a  more  stable  and  sustainable  order  in  the  Middle  East.55 The
connection between al-Qaida and the Sunni extremist Taliban regime in Afghanistan,
moreover, provided a critical opportunity to improve relations between the US and Iran
in the Gulf – throughout 1990s Iran, along with other powers such as India and Russia,
had been an active supporter of  the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.  (In contrast,  the
Taliban had been receiving substantial logistical and military backing from the Pakistani
intelligence services as well as economic support coming from Saudi Arabia – Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia being supposedly two of  America's closest partners in the region.)56
26
By the time the tragedy of 9/11 unfolded there was indeed a Bush in the White
House. He was the son of that President Bush under whose watch the Cold War had ended
peacefully and a large coalition led by the US under the aegis of the UN had won the Gulf
War, and his administration was packed with veterans of his father's team. However,
diplomatists were conspicuously absent from the staff of Bush fils. As a result, the George
W. Bush administration decided to meet the challenge posed by 9/11 by embracing in full,
and  bringing  to  its  extreme  consequences,  the  grand  strategy  based  on  American
primacy, and opted for a policy of unilateral US military intervention against the Taliban
in Afghanistan. In addition, the unilateral pursuit of the “Global War on Terror” launched
by the second President Bush, became an opportunity to settle the long-standing conflict
between  the  US  and  Iraq  on  Washington  terms,  by  invading  the  country  and
overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein – first on the basis of an unlikely connection
between the Baghdad regime and Osama bin Laden's terrorist network, which appeared
ungrounded even before  the  invasion,  and then on the  basis  of  very  weak evidence
concerning Iraq's covert pursuit of non conventional weapons, which turned out to be
false in the aftermath of the invasion.57
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27
George  W.  Bush's  “War  on  Terror”  amplified  the  effects  of  the  dysfunctional
approach endorsed by the American leadership since the end of the Cold War. First of all,
soon  after  regime  change,  the  US  found  itself  struck  in  the  effort  to  quell  bloody
insurgencies both in Afghanistan and Iraq, two countries highly heterogeneous on both
the ethnic and the sectarian level. Both occupations turned into quagmires, with negative
implications for America's global military position and the US treasury. Second, applying
the democratic principle to the political reconstruction of Iraq implied a redistribution of
power within the country in favor of the demographically predominant Shia community
–  which  had  been  historically  deprived  of  political  influence.  Thus,  a  prominent
consequence of the US policy of regime change was to open the door to Iran's influence in
Iraq.  Finally,  US  military  interventions  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  had  the  unintended
consequence of freeing Iran of two critical strategic threats – the Sunni extremist Taliban
in  the  East  and Saddam Hussein's  regime in  the  West.  Seen from Teheran,  such an
improvement made the case for pursuing a nuclear program even more compelling: a
nuclear deterrent would not only ensure the Teheran regime from external threats but
also consolidate Iran's power and influence in the Gulf region.58
28
Overall,  the  George  W.  Bush administration's  “Global  War  on Terror,”  far  from
resolving once and for all the problems of the Persian Gulf, exacerbated them. As Bush fils
prepared to leave office in January 2009, the most pressing challenges concerning the
Gulf were in fact how to exit the Iraqi quagmire without seeing the country fall back into
civil war, or even collapse,59 and how to deal with the challenge of Iran's nuclear program
– two  issues  that  were  to  say  the  least  latent  prior  to,  and  even  in  the  immediate
aftermath of, 9/11. Both developments had significant negative repercussions in terms of
US and global  energy security.  The distribution of  oil  revenues  was  a  key source of
internal  conflict  in post-Saddam Iraq,  and the civil  war that followed regime change
shattered the dreams of  a  smooth revival  of  the Iraqi  oil  industry.60 Meanwhile,  the
mounting  tension  between  the  US  and  Iran  and  the  risk  of  military  confrontation
revolving  around  the  Iranian  nuclear  program restricted  Iran's  access  to  the  global
energy market and contributed to the volatility of prices.61
 
5. Obama's “rebalancing” and the US “energy
revolution”: smart geopolitics or dangerous ideas?
29
The withdrawal of US combat troops from Iraq in December 2011 appears to have
put an end – at lest for a while – to the era of American military adventurism in the
Middle East.62 In fact,  since 2011,  the political  landscape in the Middle East has been
shaken by a wave of uprisings that have led, with varying degrees of violence, to the fall
of  some of  the most  impervious  regimes in the region –  a  process  that  has  become
commonly  known  as  the  “Arab  Spring.”  The  actual  dynamics  that  are  generating
upheaval vary significantly from country to country, but it seems fair to observe that the
main drivers of change are long lasting domestic economic and social tensions, rather
than the designs of foreign powers.63 With the notable exception of Bahrain, the oil rich
Persian Gulf Arab monarchies have been remarkably more stable than the rest of the Arab
Smart Geopolitics, Dangerous Ideas: Energy security, Ideology, and the Challe...
European journal of American studies, Vol 11, no 2 | 2016
10
world,  but  the  Gulf  states  are  nonetheless deeply  involved  in  the  varied  but
interconnected processes of political change that are transforming the Middle East.64
30
The “Obamians” appear to have tentatively begun to explore new policy approaches
concerning the Gulf – such as withdrawing combat troops from Iraq and making the US
military presence in the region more discrete, or working out a diplomatic solution to the
Iranian nuclear issue – but they're still far from achieving substantial and long-lasting
results. In their quest for a more “balanced” policy toward the region, the president and
his advisers should avoid the flawed delusional attitude – oscillating between dreams of
outright  dominance  and  dreams  of  indirect  control  –  that  characterized  past  policy
initiatives. In this era of “rebalancing,” moreover, they should also be careful not to fall
prey to fresh delusional attitudes, such as the idea of a disengagement from the region.65
This option has been made increasingly appealing by the recent “energy revolution” that
is  boosting  the  US  oil  and  gas  industry,  but  a  close  examination  suggests  that  the
implications of the new developments in the energy sector for US and Western energy
security may be limited.
31
The Persian Gulf has proved to be a source of headaches for American leaders. Since
the most consistent rationale for US and Western engagement in such a challenging area
has been energy security, it seems legitimate to assess whether new developments in the
global  energy  sector  may  create  the  conditions  for a  disengagement  on  the  part  of
Washington and its Western allies. In fact, recent improvements in drilling and extraction
technology have made unconventional  hydrocarbon resources increasingly accessible.
These breakthroughs have largely expanded the exploitable reserves of oil and gas in the
US, and have significantly revived the US oil and gas industry. US oil production has been
increasing  since  2012,  and  according  to  several  estimates  the  US  could  dramatically
reduce  hydrocarbons  imports  and get  close  to  energy  self-sufficiency  in  the  coming
decades.66 Such a new development has indeed fostered speculation about the geopolitical
implications  of  the  possible  US  “energy  independence.”  Authoritative  commentators
argue that newly exploitable non-conventional oil reserves will reduce the geopolitical
clout of a number of current major oil producers that tend to be at odds with the US,  and
that an America less addicted to foreign oil may no longer need to be so involved in
intractable issues such as Persian Gulf politics.67
32
The  recent  “energy  revolution”  in  the  US  will  make  the  US  economy  more
competitive  and  will  have  very  positive  implications  for  the  US  trade  balance.68 In
addition, increasing oil and gas production in the US contributes to the expansion of
supply  in  the  global  energy markets,  so  it  is  likely  to  moderate  global  energy price
increases and have a positive impact for all energy consuming countries.69 It seems wise,
however, to be cautious about its implications for American foreign policy.70 As noted by
Daniel Yergin, “Only one oil market exists,” that is, the global oil market. The price of oil
is a function of demand and supply dynamics that operate on a global scale, and, as a
consequence, instability in the global oil market has, and will continue to have, negative
implications  in term of  the price  of  fuel  at  the pump.71 In  the ultimate analysis,  oil
remains the most  important  energy resource,  and the Persian Gulf,  with its  massive
reserves  and very low extraction costs,  is,  and will  remain for  quite  some time,  the
greatest and strategically most important oil producing region in the world.72 That is why
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what happens in the region still matters for the security of the US and its closest allies,
and there are very few reasons to believe that politicians in Washington will  be in a
position to neglect the security challenges coming from the area.73
 
6. The case for pragmatism
33
Sadly, besides being a vitally important oil producing region, the Gulf is also an area
of instability and inter-state tensions with persistent threats – such as terrorism and
nuclear  proliferation –  contributing to the volatility  of  global  oil  prices.  The US has
played – and continues to play as these pages are written – a most prominent role in the
Persian Gulf. Such a role derives from America's status as the greatest military power in
the world as well as from its interest in ensuring a stable and abundant supply of oil in
global markets. As shown by this essay, however, the interplay of strategic, economic, and
ideological factors that characterizes American policy toward the region has produced an
unsustainable equilibrium that challenges the very rationale of US involvement – global
energy security.
34
It is important to acknowledge that US policy toward the Persian Gulf has suffered
from a lack of realism on the part of American leaders. Washington strategists have too
often been ready to believe that they could count on compliant local clients, or that they
could  opportunistically  exploit  regional  rivalries,  or  that  they  could  manipulate  the
region's  balance  of  power  by  resorting  to  military  power  in  order  to  protect  their
interests without the need to make compromises. Such an approach has largely failed.
Massive  US  military  intervention  often  exacerbated  conflicts  and  instability,  and,
contrary to the expectations of so many politicians and armchair strategists, it led to
restrictions in free flow of oil from the region. Furthermore, although US policy became
more and more unilateral, the implications of American actions remained multilateral
and  ramified  –  and  frequently  had  the  unintended  consequence  of  improving  the
strategic position of powers, such as Iran, that challenge the US role and presence in the
region.
35
As observed by Mahmoud El-Gamal and Amy Myers Jaffe, instability in the Persian
Gulf seems to have created a sort of vicious circle with cyclical implications on the price
of oil in global markets: “petrodollar flows create a military buildup that escalates the
risk of conflict, which in turn increases the petrodollar flows and feeds more military
buildups and potential conflict, and so on.”74 Because of its approach characterized by
massive military involvement but lack of political realism, the US has become part of this
vicious circle.
36
It seems reasonable to maintain that only the political will of the local populations
and their  leaders  can  interrupt  this  detrimental  dynamic.  As  the  story  of  American
involvement in the Gulf suggests, no external intervention, and especially no military
intervention, should be considered capable of changing “hearts and minds” on its own.
Since  some  form  of  engagement  between  the  region  and  the  rest  of  the  world  is
inescapable,  however,  a more pragmatic assessment of the interests at stake and the
means to protect them on the part of leaders in Washington and in allied capitals could at
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least reduce the effects of the vicious circle and contribute to create the conditions for
improving stability and security in the area.
37
The paramount priority for the US, and for the rest of the international community,
concerning the Persian Gulf, is to promote the emergence of a more stable and inclusive
equilibrium in the area, in order to minimize the effects of geopolitical risk on the global
energy markets and reduce the incentives for local regimes to invest their wealth in arms
and national security apparatuses.  Thus, in the short term, efforts should concentrate on
fostering a modus vivendi among the region's greatest powers and encourage the mutual
recognition of the regimes in place in the area. From this point of view, the July 2015 Iran
nuclear  deal  –  which  sets limits  on,  and  increases  international  supervision  over,
Tehran’s  nuclear program in exchange for the gradual  lift  of  international  economic
sanctions against Iran – appears to be a step in the right direction and possibly a game
changer in the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf.75 Nuclear proliferation should always be a
source of concern for policymakers, but coercive measures such as sanctions and military
strikes are not sustainable long term solutions to that challenge because they fail  to
address the critical political issues that prompt a country to engage in the development
of a nuclear deterrent – such as the desire to hedge against a real or perceived existential
threat.76 The eventual normalization of relations between Iran and the US is far from
certain,  and the deal  has given rise to political  squabbles in the US Congress and to
uncertainty and resentment among long-standing US allies in the region.77 Given Iran's
potential geopolitical clout, its influence over the Shia communities in the Arab world
and the close relations of the Iranian government with the Assad regime in Syria and
militant groups such as Lebanon's Hezbollah, these concerns should not be overlooked.
Iran's economic and political revival, however, appears to be a critical but inescapable
challenge for the stability of the Persian Gulf. Moreover, the country's new leadership
appears to be much less inclined to sacrifice Iranian economic revival on the altar of
confrontation with the US.78 Hence,  political  negotiations,  no matter how difficult  or
embarrassing, must have priority over costly and potentially counterproductive coercive
measures. Considering the history of the region, Iran's desire for greater security and a
greater role on the regional level is not an unreasonable aspiration, as long as the Tehran
leadership understands that Iran should refrain from seeking regional hegemony. As a
matter of fact, once a more pragmatic attitude is embraced, it turns out that Iran and the
West do have a number of very important interests in common – they want a stable Iraq
at peace with its neighbors, they do not want Afghanistan to be dominated by the Taliban,
and Iran is  the  shortest  and cheapest  route  for  Caspian oil  and gas  to  reach global
markets.79  Building upon those shared interests would not only minimize the risks of
nuclear  proliferation  in  the  Gulf,  but  also  have  positive  political  and  economic
implications for the region and beyond.
38
A critical long term challenge in the framing of a more stable and inclusive regional
order in the Gulf is the need to cope with the imbalance between the oil-producing Arab
monarchies and their more powerful neighbors, Iran and Iraq. Until recently, the policy
of  choice to deal  with this  problem was a  combination of  increasing arms sales  and
increasing direct US military presence in the region. Such an approach has proved to be
extremely costly and frustrating, and the time seems ripe to seriously explore new policy
approaches. In fact, a careful assessment of the global strategic and economic relevance
of the Persian Gulf suggests that not only the US and its Western allies, but also emerging
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Asian powers, particularly China, have an interest in stability, economic opportunities,
and access to energy resources in the area.80Strategists in Washington and allied capitals
should not panic over greater involvement of these powers in the region, but rather
encourage them to invest constructively their increasing economic and political influence
in  the  promotion  of  a  more  cooperative  and  inclusive  regional  order.81Enthusiast
supporters  of  American  primacy  might  denounce  such  an  approach  as  a  “declinist”
attitude; other, more pragmatic observers and practitioners might welcome it as a useful
recognition  of  the  limits  of  power  and  a  smart  way  to  reduce  costly  military




The political evolution of the Gulf – and for that matter of the whole Middle East – is
something that policymakers in Washington can neither ignore nor control. Hence, the
US and its Western allies should not strive to reshape or control the geopolitics of the
Persian  Gulf  –  both  approaches  are  unfeasible.  The  idea  of  disengagement  from the
region, moreover, appears delusional even when the implications of the unconventional
energy revolution are held into account. Rather, America and its allies should focus their
engagement  on  promoting  better  mutual  understanding  among  regional  actors  and
greater  cooperation among the  regional  and global  powers  that  have  a  stake  in  the
stability  of  such  a  strategically  and  economically  important  area.  Short  of  such  a
framework  of  coordination  and  mutual  understanding,  the  resort  to  US  and  allied
military power should be considered not only ineffective, but even counterproductive. In
the long run a less militarized, more stable, and more inclusive regional framework could
even become the basis for promoting in the Gulf some of the developments that America's
military adventures have failed to achieve, such as the spread of democracy and respect
for human rights.
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ABSTRACTS
Both  as  a  superpower  and  as  the  West's  leading  security  provider,  the  US  has  seen  its
commitment to the stability of the Gulf region and the preservation of access to its oil supplies
increase.  US  Persian  Gulf  policy,  however,  has  been  shaped  not  only  by  pure  geopolitical
considerations,  but  also  by  ideological  factors  concerning  America's  status  and  role  in
international relations. Until recently, US policy toward the Persian Gulf was distorted by the
appeal  of  America's  unchallenged  military  primacy.  Confronted  with  the  contradictions  and
dilemmas  of  promoting  ideals  and  protecting  the  national  interest,  US  policy-makers
demonstrated a remarkable penchant for instituting policies that overestimated the potential of
America's military power as a tool for creating new political realities and favorable outcomes in
the region. Such an approach has proved to be extremely costly and frustrating, while the time
seems  ripe  to  explore  new  strategies.  The  US  should  not  strive  to  reshape  or  control  the
geopolitics of the Gulf, as both these approaches are unfeasible. The idea of disengagement from
the region,  moreover,  appears  delusional  even when the  implications  of  the  unconventional
energy  revolution  are  held  into  account.  Rather,  America  and  its  allies  should  focus  their
engagement  on  protecting  their  interests  without  becoming  part  of  the  region’s  sources  of
instability. 
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